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Klein’s target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition
for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only
episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the
standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient
for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and
procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Kleinmounts a convincing
attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the ‘doors ofmemory’ too far, but this
commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It may
be preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which
causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage,
and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less
demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition
implies that both episodic and semanticmemory count as genuine forms ofmemory
but that procedural memory does not. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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THE SCOPE OF MEMORY
While Klein’s discussion of the scope of memory isultimately meant to feed back into empirical
memory research, his central question belongs squarely
to what philosophers refer to as the metaphysics of
memory (e.g., see ref. 1): when does a given mental
occurrence count as an instance of remembering? In
attempting to answer this question, Klein formulates
a set of conditions that aremeant to be individually nec-
essary and jointly sufficient for a given occurrence’s
being an instance of remembering. Thematter of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for memory is one about
which philosophers have had much to say, and Klein’s
discussion draws extensively on the history of philoso-
phy ofmemory, identifying a common thread in ancient,
modern, and contemporary philosophical treatments,
namely, an insistence on the importance ofwhatTulving
has influentially dubbed autonoetic consciousness.2
Memory, on the view that Klein finds in these historical
treatments, is characterized by its past-oriented subjec-
tive temporality: memory ‘is a term that is (or should
be) reserved for those experiences directly felt to be a
reliving of the circumstances from which they were
acquired’ (p. 6); it ‘is not the content of experience,
but the experience of that content’ (p. 20).
If this view is right, then, of the systems which
psychologists standardly group under the heading of
memory—including episodic, semantic, and proce-
dural systems—only episodicmemory is, strictly speak-
ing, memory, as it alone enables us to subjectively relive
the past. Like Tulving,3 among others, Klein maintains
that autonoesis is a defining characteristic of episodic
memory itself: memory for past episodes that is not
accompanied by autonoesis is not, strictly speaking,
episodic memory. In combination with the more gen-
eral claim that only episodic memory is memory, this
characterization of episodic memory implies that sub-
jects with impaired autonoesis who nonetheless
retrieve information about specific past events are
not really remembering at all. It likewise implies that,
if animal ‘episodic-like memory’ does not involve
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autonoetic consciousness, animals are not just incapa-
ble of episodically remembering—they are incapable of
remembering. While the importance of autonoesis is
widely recognized in current research on mental time
travel, Klein’s view of the scope of memory is thus dra-
matically narrower than the standard view.
While Klein’s attack on the standard broad view
is convincing, this commentary will argue that an inter-
mediate view—on which episodic and semantic mem-
ory are genuine forms of memory but procedural
memory is not—is a viable alternative to his narrow
view. This brief commentary cannot provide a decisive
case for the view that memory should be equated with
declarative memory, and, of course, researchers in psy-
chology, neuroscience, and other fields concerned with
memory are free to adopt whatever definition of ‘mem-
ory’ they findmost useful. The issue here is aboutwhich
definition is likely to be useful in the long run; the com-
mentary argues that defining memory as declarative
memory is likely to prove more useful than alternative
definitions. Klein assumes (along with others in this
area4,5) thatwewant our scientific vocabulary to ‘carve
nature at its joints’: ideally, that is, we want to formu-
late a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
delineate the boundaries of a natural kind, a kind found
in nature, as opposed to a merely nominal kind, a kind
thatwe project onto nature but that does not accurately
reflect boundaries between natural phenomena. Natu-
ral kinds, unlike merely nominal kinds, are capable of
supporting reliable inductive inference:6 by learning
something about some instances of a kind, we can learn
something about others. If the narrow view is right,
then any attempt to infer properties of semantic mem-
ory on the basis of findings about episodic memory, or
vice versa, is eventually bound to go astray. If the inter-
mediate view is right, on the other hand, episodic and
semantic memory can legitimately be grouped together
as members of a common superordinate kind, in line
with the standard practice of treating declarative mem-
ory as a coherent whole.
THREE VIEWS
What, exactly, is the broad view? The standard view, as
Klein puts it, is that memory ‘consists of an initial act of
registration (learning) which, via the continuity
assumed to be necessary and provided by the mechan-
ism of storage, eventuates in an act of retrieval’ (p. 3).
This definition is meant to apply to procedural as well
as declarative memory, but the language of encoding,
storage, and retrieval is ill-suited to describe the former.
Though researchers sometimes write as if procedural
memory involves processes of encoding, storage, and
retrieval of rule-based information, trying to bring
these concepts into play in the context of purely behav-
ioral skills is, as Tulving put it, ‘awkward at best and
silly at worst.’7 Because a system need not represent
the rules governing a learned behavior in order for its
behavior to be governed by those rules, references to
storage of information in descriptions of procedural
memory are in general otiose.4
Nevertheless, the claim that procedural memory
is a genuine form of memory clearly makes some intu-
itive sense (whether or not we ultimately end up reject-
ing it), so something less demanding than a definition in
terms of encoding, storage, and retrieval must be at
work here. Klein links the standard view to the
causal theory of memory that has been influential in
philosophy,8 and this link suggests a suitable interpreta-
tion of the standardview.The core idea of the causal the-
ory is that remembering is a matter of standing in the
right sort of causal relation to past events. What it is
for a causal relation to be of the ‘right sort’ is a technical
question that we need not go into here (e.g., ref. 1), but
such a causal relation in principle need not involve
encoding, storage, or retrieval of content. There are var-
ious ways in which a subject’s performance, at the time
of remembering,might causally dependonhis past expe-
rience. In the case of declarative remembering, the causal
connection will normally go via encoding, storage, and
retrieval of content. In the case of procedural remember-
ing, the causal connectionmay not depend on encoding,
storage, and retrieval of content but instead on direct
modification of the pathways involved in performing
the relevant action. Thus a causal condition, as opposed
to an encoding-storage-retrieval condition, allows us to
classify procedural memory as memory, and hence it is
plausible that what is ultimately doing the work in the
standard view is a causal condition.
While Klein does not distinguish between these
two conditions, the distinction is crucial in assessing
the success of the argument for his narrow view
of the scope of memory. Running the two conditions
together, Klein contrasts the narrow view with the
standard view, arguing that ‘a current mental state is
an act ofmemory… if and only if both conditions (con-
nection to the past [where this refers both to the causal
condition and to the encoding-storage-retrieval condi-
tion] and past-oriented subjective temporality [i.e., the
autonoesis condition]) are in play’ (p. 6). Bearing the
distinction between the conditions in mind, we can
see that in fact we face a choice among three progres-
sively narrower views of the scope of memory:
• A broad view: a given mental occurrence is an
instance of remembering if and only if it satisfies
the causal condition.
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• An intermediate view: a given mental occurrence
is an instance of remembering if and only if it
satisfies (1) the causal condition and (2) the
encoding-storage-retrieval condition.a
• A narrow view: a given mental occurrence is an
instance of remembering if and only if it satisfies
(1) the causal condition, (2) the encoding-storage-
retrieval condition, and (3) the autonoesis
condition.
The broad view is the standard view, while the narrow
view is Klein’s. As noted above, the broad view counts
episodic, semantic, and procedural memory as genuine
forms of memory; the narrow view counts only epi-
sodic memory as genuine memory. As both episodic
and semantic memory involve encoding, storage, and
retrieval of information but procedural memory does
not, the intermediate view counts episodic and seman-
tic memory but not procedural memory as genuine
forms of memory. (See Figure 1.)
THE NARROW VIEW VERSUS THE
BROAD VIEW
Given the complexity of Klein’s three-stage argument
against the broad view and for the narrow view, it is
necessary to briefly review its structure before attempt-
ing to determine its success.
The first, historical stage of the argument appeals
to philosophical tradition to argue that autonoesis is a
necessary condition for remembering. Starting with
Aristotle’s remark that ‘memory is of the past,’9 philo-
sophers have tended to view remembering as being dis-
tinguished from other mental acts by its connection to
past experience. The idea here is not merely that mem-
ory is of the past in the sense of being from the past but
rather that memory is of the past in the sense of being
about the past. Moreover, as Klein interprets this liter-
ature, the ‘past aboutness’ of memory is not supposed
to be merely a matter of content that refers to the past
but rather a matter of the phenomenology of remem-
bering: the past-aboutness of memory is ‘a directly-
given feeling of reacquaintance’ with past events
(p. 9), i.e., autonoesis.b
The second, conceptual stage has several compo-
nents. First, Klein argues that, unlike episodic memory,
semantic and procedural memory ‘do not have the
“right sort” of temporal orientation’ to count as mem-
ory (p. 15). Episodic memory is subjectively oriented
toward the past, in the sense that it provides the subject
with a sense of re-experiencing past events. In contrast,
the subjective temporal orientation of semantic and
procedural memory is toward the ‘now and next,’ in
FIGURE 1 | Three views on the scope of memory.
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the sense that, while they originate in experience of past
events, they function to enable the subject to act suc-
cessfully in the present and immediate future.
Second, he argues that views which see semantic
and procedural memory as genuine forms of memory
commit the ‘part/whole error.’ It is natural to view
semantic and procedural memory as genuine forms
of memory because they satisfy some of the conditions
necessary for memory (the causal condition or the
encoding-storage-retrieval condition). But such views
are mistaken because they ignore the fact that semantic
and procedural memory fail to satisfy another condi-
tion necessary for memory, namely, the autonoesis
condition.
Third, Klein argues that the systems that are
standardly classified as memory ‘exhibit a degree of
computational and phenomenological diversity’which
suggests that the broad view fails to track ‘meaningful
distinctions in nature’ (p. 15). As far as procedural
memory goes, he argues that the various forms of learn-
ing grouped under this heading obey radically different
rules and manifest in radically different ways. As far as
semantic memory goes, he argues that ‘[t]he variety of
psychological entities that fall under the heading
“semantic memory” is extensive (e.g., propositions,
facts, abstractions, schemata, images, rules, language,
etc.)’ and that semantic memory lacks phenomenolog-
ical unity (p. 15). In general, he argues that the broad
view ‘has the unfortunate consequence of opening the
“doors of memory” to most of the mental states and
cognitive processes one can envision’ (p. 15): sincemost
cognitive states and processes depend in some way on
past experience, treating the causal condition as suffi-
cient for memory implies that we should count all sorts
of cognitive states and processes as memory, rendering
the term effectively meaningless.
The final, empirical stage of the argument reviews
a range of clinical cases of impaired autonoesis to pro-
vide support for drawing the episodic/semantic distinc-
tion in phenomenological rather than content-based
terms. A first key point here is that semantic memory
can provide information about the ‘what, where, and
when’ of past events, information which may in princi-
ple originate in experience of those events; the episodic/
semantic distinction therefore cannot be marked by the
kind of content provided by the system but must rather
bemarked by the form of awareness bywhich that con-
tent is accompanied. A second key point is that auton-
oetic awareness is not intrinsic to stored content (the
intrinsic view) but rather is optionally conjoined with
it at the time of retrieval (the relational view). Patient
R.B., who suffered temporarily impaired autonoetic
consciousness while retaining an intact ability to
retrieve detailed information about past events,11
provides the central illustration of this point. The
upshot is that stored content is neither episodic nor
semantic as such—content may meaningfully be
referred to as episodic only if and when it becomes
the object of autonoetic awareness at retrieval.
THE CASE FOR THE
INTERMEDIATE VIEW
If Klein’s argument is successful, it establishes the nar-
row view of the scope of memory and shows that epi-
sodic memory alone satisfies the conditions necessary
for memory. A careful examination of the historical,
conceptual, and empirical considerations invoked by
the argument, however, shows that, while the argu-
ment tells strongly against the broad view, the interme-
diate view remains a viable alternative to the
narrow view.
Historical Considerations
How strong is the positive case for including the
autonoesis condition in our view of the nature of mem-
ory? The philosophical arguments that Klein cites in
favor of the necessity of autonoesis essentially appeal
to our pretheoretic intuitions about whether a given
state is a state of remembering or not. Such intuitions
may provide a legitimate starting point for inquiry,
but they should not provide the end point, for intuitions
at best which reveal the contours of our folk concepts,
and such concepts often fail to track the boundaries of
natural kinds.12 To cite awell-worn example, jade intu-
itively appears to be a natural kind, but in fact it turns
out to consist of two distinct minerals and hence fails to
qualify as a natural kind.13Moreover, there is reason to
think that the folk concept of memory, in particular,
may not even be coherent, in which case it is bound
not to correspond to a natural kind. Philosophers have
indeed often argued that remembering requires a sub-
jective orientation to the past, but there are many
exceptions (e.g., Bergson; see ref. 14). The history of
the highly varied metaphors that have been used to
describememory likewise calls the coherence of the folk
concept into question.15
What is needed, then, rather than a priori argu-
ments for the necessity of autonoesis, is an empirically
grounded argument; but the prospects for developing
such an argument are slim. On one influential
account,16 natural kinds are homoeostatic clusters of
properties—clusters of properties such that the pres-
ence of some of them tends (via underlying mechan-
isms) to reinforce or bring about the presence of
others.c What would be required, given such a view
of the nature of natural kinds, is evidence that the
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presence of autonoesis covaries with the presence of
other recognized features of memory. The obvious
move to make here is to suggest that the presence of
autonoesis covaries with the presence of information
about the past. For several reasons, however, this will
not work. First, as Klein himself emphasizes, the
semantic system is equally capable of providing infor-
mation about the what, when, and where of past
events. Second, focusing on information about the past,
as opposed to retrieved information more broadly,
would be question begging in the current context, as
the question at hand is precisely that of whether mem-
ory is broader than episodic memory. Finally, even if
we restrict our attention to episodic-like forms of mem-
ory, the presence of autonoesis may not covarywith the
presence of information about the past; certain bird
species, for example, are capable of forms of memory
that are functionally similar to episodic memory but
presumably do not involve autonoesis.17
Empirical Considerations
In short, the historical argument provides little reason
to take autonoesis to be a necessary condition formem-
ory, viewed as a natural kind, and there is no obvious
alternative argument for that claim in the offing. Dowe
have reason to take autonoesis, more narrowly, to be a
necessary condition for episodic memory? There is no
need to adopt a definite answer to this question here,
but assessing the limitations of Klein’s empirical argu-
ment for an affirmative answer will suggest that,
whether or not autonoesis ultimately turns out to be
necessary for episodic memory, there is good reason
to deny that it is necessary for memory as such.
In support of the claim that autonoesis is neces-
sary for episodic memory, Klein reviews a number of
cases of impaired autonoesis, among which the case
of patient R.B. is of particular interest. R.B. manifested
impaired autonoetic consciousness but was neverthe-
less able to retrieve detailed representations of events
from his personal past. The narrow view of the scope
ofmemory implies that, despite R.B.’s ability to retrieve
this information, he was incapable of remembering the
events in question. Against this background, it is note-
worthy that the patient repeatedly described himself as
remembering, even while being vividly aware of his
impaired autonoesis. For example:
When I remember the scenewithmy friends, studying, I
remembermyself walking into the room…and…other
things I did and felt…But it feels like something I didn’t
experience…(something I) was told about by someone
else. (p. 19; emphasis added)
I…(am) remembering scenes, not facts…I am recalling
scenes…that is…I can clearly recall a scene ofme at the
beach in New London with my family as a child. But
the feeling is that the scene is not my memory …as if
I was looking at a photo of someone else’s vacation.
(p. 19–20; emphasis added)
Kleinmight argue that the references to remembering in
R.B.’s reports are not doing any semantic work—that
the occurrences of ‘remember,’ ‘recall,’ and so onmight
be replaced with ‘picture,’ ‘think of,’ etc. without alter-
ing the meaning of the reports (see p. 14). But this
would run roughshod over the patient’s insistence that
he was remembering: by repeatedly emphasizing
that he was remembering, R.B. was presumably trying
to mark a distinction between the mental acts that
he was performing and other, similar mental acts
that he might have been performing instead—he was
‘remembering’ scenes, not merely ‘picturing’ them,
whether or not it felt like he was doing so.
The distinction marked by the patient is one
worth marking in our theory. On one natural interpre-
tation, R.B. is insisting that he is retrieving content
originating in his own experience of the relevant
events, despite the unusual phenomenology by which
his acts of retrieval are accompanied. This is in line
with the intermediate view of the scope of memory,
on which satisfaction of the encoding-storage-retrieval
condition is necessary for remembering but satisfaction
of the autonoesis condition is not. The intermediate
view thus has the advantage of marking a clear distinc-
tion between remembering an event and merely
picturing it.
The narrow view, on the other hand, tends to
obscure this distinction. Consider three hypothetical
subjects. Subject 1 retrieves a representation of an expe-
rienced episode and enjoys autonoetic awareness. Sub-
ject 2 is like R.B.: he retrieves a representation of an
experienced episode but lacks autonoetic awareness.
Subject 3 simply pictures a hypothetical episode that
he has not experienced. The intermediate view groups
subjects 1 and 2 together: there is something atypical
about subject 2, but both subjects 1 and 2 are remem-
bering scenes; subject 3 is merely picturing a scene. The
narrow view groups subjects 2 and 3 together: only sub-
ject 1 is remembering a scene; subjects 2 and 3 are both
merely picturing scenes. The narrowviewdoes permit us
to acknowledge that subjects 1 and 2 have something in
common, since they both satisfy the encoding-storage-
retrieval condition, but it places the fundamental
dividing line between subject 1, on the one hand, and
subjects 2 and 3, on the other. Given that we are aiming
to identify the boundaries of a natural kind, this would
seem to be the wrong place to put it: retrieval without
WIREs Cognitive Science Is declarative memory a natural kind?
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autonoesis has more in common with retrieval with
autonoesis than it does with mere picturing.
Conceptual Considerations
Thus, while it is an open question at this point whether
autonoesis is a necessary condition for episodic mem-
ory, we have good reason to reject the claim that it is
a necessary condition formemory.What of the concep-
tual argument, which suggests that rejecting the latter
claim forces us to group together a miscellaneous
assortment of processes that do not have enough in
common to plausibly constitute a natural kind? An
assessment of the limitations of the conceptual argu-
ment suggests that, while there may be good reason
for rejecting the broad view of memory, there are also
good reasons for rejecting the narrow view, leaving the
intermediate view as a strong contender.
The conceptual argument, again, has three com-
ponents: first, Klein argues that semantic and proce-
dural memory do not share the subjective temporal
orientation of episodic memory; second, he argues that
classifying semantic and procedural memory as forms
of memory relies on the part/whole error; third, he
argues that, since awide variety ofmental states depend
on past experience, rejecting the necessity of autonoesis
would commit us to classifying far too many mental
states as memory. The second component provides
no evidence for the narrow view beyond that provided
by the historical argument: in order to reject broader
views on the ground that they commit the part/whole
error, we must assume that autonoesis is necessary
for memory; but that is precisely what we are trying
to determine here. We may therefore set this compo-
nent of the argument aside.
The first component of the argument involves an
error which, while subtle, quickly leads to an overesti-
mation of the phenomenological differences between
episodic memory and semantic and procedural mem-
ory. Klein claims that (1)episodic memory is unique
among (putative) forms of memory in that it is subjec-
tively oriented toward the past and (2) other (putative)
forms of long-term memory are subjectively oriented
toward the present and future (the ‘now and next’),
in that they are designed not to give subjects access
to past events but rather to enable them to respond suc-
cessfully to present and future events. The error here is
one of equivocation. Consider the first part of the
claim. In a phenomenological sense, episodic memory
is indeed past-oriented, and uniquely so: semantic
memory, even when it provides information about
the what, when, and where of past events, does not
involve a feeling of re-experiencing those events; and
procedural memory does not provide information
about past events at all. But (in contrast to future-
oriented mental time travel, which may involve a feel-
ing of ‘pre-experiencing’ future events) semantic and
procedural memories are clearly not future oriented
in the relevant phenomenological sense. Now consider
the second part of the claim. Semantic and procedural
memories are future oriented in a functional sense: in
evolutionary terms, they are designed to enable the
agent to respond successfully to upcoming events.
The same thing, however, can be said of any cognitive
capacity that can be assumed to be an adaptation,
including episodic memory, which presumably func-
tions to enable us to respond successfully to upcoming
events by giving us access to past events.d The upshot
is that the difference in temporal orientation between
episodic memory and semantic and procedural memory
is considerably less pronounced thanKlein takes it to be:
semantic and procedural memories lack the phenome-
nology characteristic of episodic memory; but they do
not have an outright incompatible phenomenology.
The third component of the argument likewise
goes wrong; identifying the error here takes some work
but strongly suggests that, if episodic memory is a nat-
ural kind, then declarative memory as a whole must be
as well. Klein’s worry is that rejecting the autonoesis
condition has the consequence of opening ‘the doors
ofmemory’much toowide, simply because awide vari-
ety of cognitive states and processes causally depend on
past experience. But rejecting the autonoesis condition
does not in fact require us to open the doors of memory
to just any cognitive state or process that causally
depends on past experience.Whatmatters is not simply
that a state or process is causally connected to past
experience but rather how it is so connected. Again, this
is a technical matter the details of which are irrelevant
here, but, to a first approximation, what matters is
whether the causal connection amounts to the preser-
vation of something from past experience. As noted
above, if we rely on the causal condition alone, we
end up counting both semantic and procedural mem-
ory as memory, because semantic memory involves
the preservation of information and procedural mem-
ory involves the preservation of behavioral patterns.
If we rely additionally on the encoding-storage-
retrieval condition, only semantic memory makes the
cut. In neither case do we have to take on board other
cognitive states and processes—imagining counterfac-
tual scenes, for example, relies on information originat-
ing in past experience but is not about preserving or
matching past experience. Thus rejecting the autono-
esis condition need not result in throwing the doors
of memory all the way open.
It might nevertheless result in throwing
them too far open. Klein argues that the generally
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recognized forms of memory—episodic, semantic, and
procedural—exhibit a high degree of phenomenologi-
cal, computational, and anatomical diversity, making
it unlikely that they have enough in common to consti-
tute a natural kind. There are two aspects to this point:
on the one hand, diversity between different (putative)
forms of memory; on the other hand, diversity within
each (putative) form of memory. As far as diversity
between systems goes, there is an important asymmetry
between procedural and semantic memory. We dealt
with the phenomenological level above. At the compu-
tational level, procedural memory does not involve the
encoding, storage, or retrieval of content; it is, in an
important sense, noncognitive.4 Both semantic and epi-
sodic memories, in contrast, satisfy the encoding-stor-
age-retrieval condition. At the anatomical level,
procedural systems are distinct from episodic memory.
Semantic and episodic memory, in contrast, exhibit
considerable anatomical overlap, both depending on
medial temporal lobe structures. As far as diversity
within systems goes, there is likewise an important
asymmetry between procedural and semantic memory.
Klein points out that semantic memory is concerned
with diverse kinds of content; I come back to this point
below. This point aside, semantic memory seems to
constitute a unified capacity. Procedural memory,
however, refers to a highly varied collection of capaci-
ties which lack any clear unity. In short, the case for
excluding procedural memory from memory, viewed
as a natural kind, is considerably stronger than the case
for excluding semantic memory.
If we elect to close the doors of memory far
enough to keep procedural memory out, should we
close them even further, to keep semantic memory
out as well? Klein, of course, would have us do so,
but he himself raises a consideration that suggests that
we should not. As noted above, Klein appeals to the
internal diversity of semantic memory at the level of
computation or content, pointing out that semantic
memory refers to a wide variety of kinds of content;
the suggestion is that the representational diversity of
semantic memory disqualifies it from constituting a
natural kind. If the representational diversity of seman-
ticmemory disqualifies it as a natural kind, however, so
must that of episodic memory. As Klein emphasizes,
both episodic and semantic memories are capable of
providing information about the what, when, and
where of past events. More importantly, if we grant
the relational view of autonoesis, stored content is nei-
ther episodic nor semantic: ‘there is no logical or empir-
ical basis for asserting that the content of these two
systems should differ’ (p. 17). For example, content
provided by semantic memory can be highly detailed
and have complex narrative structure, as with memory
for the script for eating a meal in a restaurant, and con-
tent provided by episodic memory can be extremely
simple and lack any significant structure, as with mem-
ory for a word encountered on a list (p. 23). If content
as such is neither episodic nor semantic, and if the rep-
resentational diversity of semanticmemory implies that
semantic memory is not a natural kind, then the very
same representational diversity should imply that epi-
sodic memory is not a natural kind.
Klein does suggest that the unity of episodicmem-
ory is underwritten by its phenomenology, asserting
that ‘episodic memory consists in a homogeneous col-
lection of mental occurrences’ on the ground that all
instances of episodic memory have the same past-
oriented subjective temporality (p. 15). For two rea-
sons, this move is not particularly convincing. First,
we have seen that there is some reason to think that epi-
sodic remembering may occur without autonoetic con-
sciousness, in which case episodic memory would lack
the asserted homogeneity. Second, if autonoetic con-
sciousness provides sufficient unity to counterbalance
the representational diversity of episodic memory, it
is difficult to see why noetic consciousness should not
likewise provide sufficient unity to counterbalance
the representational diversity of semantic memory. In
sum, it seems safe to conclude that considerations of
representational diversity rule out semantic memory
as a natural kind only if they rule out episodic memory
as a natural kind. But to rule episodic memory out on
this ground would be to close the doors of memory
entirely, leaving the category of genuine memory
empty. Representational diversity should therefore be
set aside: both episodic and semantic memory may
qualify as natural kinds, despite their shared represen-
tational diversity.
CONCLUSIONS
Howwide, then, should we open the doors ofmemory?
The historical argument does not provide strong posi-
tive reason to accept the necessity of the autonoesis con-
dition, and there is no obvious alternative argument
available. Considering the empirical argument actually
provides some positive reason to reject the necessity of
the autonoesis condition. Considering the conceptual
argument, finally, confirms the insufficiency of the
causal condition, taken on its own, and suggests that
the encoding-storage-retrieval condition does an ade-
quate job of discriminating between memory and non-
memory without the help of the autonoesis condition.
We can thus conclude that, while the broad view of the
nature ofmemorymay be too broad, the narrowview is
WIREs Cognitive Science Is declarative memory a natural kind?
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likely to be too narrow; the intermediate view thus
deserves a closer look.e
NOTES
a Satisfaction of the encoding-storage-retrieval condition
is naturally taken to imply satisfaction of the causal condi-
tion, but it may not do so, so they are mentioned sepa-
rately here.
b The philosophical literature does contain other, non-phe-
nomenological versions of the idea thatmemory has a distinc-
tive sort of past aboutness. Many recent proposals, for
example, locate the past aboutness of (episodic) memory at
the level of content rather than phenomenology, arguing
that the content of a memory representation includes an
explicitly past-oriented component (see ref. 10); on such
views, memory could refer to the past without necessarily
feeling like it does.
c Alternative views of the nature of natural kinds are availa-
ble, but these aremostly designedwith the physical sciences in
mind and are consequently too stringent to be applicable to
most psychological kinds.
d Accepting this point does not presuppose any particular
account of the way in which access to past events enables suc-
cessful response to future events, but see ref. 18 for one plau-
sible account.
e While this commentary has taken the causal condition for
granted, there is a case to be made against it.19 If we abandon
the causal condition—this would admittedly be an unortho-
dox move—the intermediate view would amount to the claim
that remembering only requires satisfaction of the encoding-
storage-retrieval condition.As noted above, it is natural to take
that condition to imply the causal condition, but the recon-
structive character of the memory process suggests that it
may not do so. Reconstruction in remembering is normally
taken to imply that content may be modified between experi-
ence and remembering; as long as some content is preserved
between experience and remembering, the causal condition
will be satisfied. But if reconstruction in remembering
implies that no part of the content of a retrievedmemory needs
derivation from the content of the subject’s experience of the
relevant event, the causal condition need not be satisfied.
Exploring the implications of a version of the intermediate
view which abandons the causal condition is a challenge for
future work; see ref. 19 for initial steps in this direction.
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